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Voter Initiatives in Illinois: Where Are We after
Chicago Bar Association v. State Board of
Elections?
I. INTRODUCTION
The voter initiative is an increasingly popular and influential
form of lawmaking in the United States.' Initiatives provide a
form of popular, direct democracy involving grass-roots campaigns
in which voters place specific issues directly onto the ballot. Direct
voter initiatives permit voters to propose legislation or constitu-
tional amendments without the aid of the legislature, usually
through a petitioning process.2 Initiatives can be controversial,
and opponents to such popular democracy argue that initiatives
are subject to great abuse.3 Despite this occasional controversy,
the Progressives of the early twentieth century and other reformers
in the United States heralded the initiative as a way to gain control
1. Seventeen state constitutional provisions allow proposals for constitutional amend-
ment or revision through a popular initiative procedure: ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 1;
ARK. CONST. amend. VII; CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 10, art. XVIII, § 3; COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 5; ILL. CONST. art XIV, § 3; MASS. CONST.
amend. XLVIII, pts. 1-4, amend. LXXXI; MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2; Mo. CONsT. art.
III, §§ 49-51; MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 4; NEV. CONST.
art. XIX, §§ 2-4; N.D. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-10; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1; OKLA. CONST.
art. V, §§ 1-3; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, §§ 1-3.
Because revision of state constitutions in this country occurs frequently, it is possible
that a majority of the states may allow for constitutional amendment or revision through
the initiative process in the near future. Comment, The Revision of American State Con-
stitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 1473, 1481 (1987). See generally Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions.- Some
Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L.J. 371, 372 (1984) (explaining that reliance on state consti-
tutional law by attorneys and the courts recently has increased).
2. See generally Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1510-
13 (1990) (explaining the different types of direct democracy, including voter initiatives).
An indirect initiative places an issue before the legislature for its approval before the issue
is placed on the ballot. Id. at 1511. Thus, it does not provide the straight route to the
voters found through a direct initiative. Unless otherwise noted, initiatives discussed in
this Note are direct initiatives.
3. See Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of
Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738-58 (1988).
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over governments that were running rampant with corruption.
The idea of using the initiative as a "final resort . . . against
unresponsive political leaders"' was especially attractive in Illinois,
where government scandals had received much publicity on a regu-
lar basis since the time of Al Capone.6 In its constitution of 1970,
Illinois adopted a provision allowing the proposal of constitutional
amendments by initiative.7 The Illinois provision is limited, how-
ever, and allows amendment proposals by initiative to affect only
certain aspects of the legislative article of the Illinois Constitution.'
The Illinois Supreme Court recently interpreted this relatively
new constitutional provision in Chicago Bar Association v. State
Board of Elections.9 Specifically, the court addressed whether an
initiative-proposed amendment could be used to change the legisla-
tive revenue raising process. 10 The court held that such an amend-
ment proposal exceeded the intended scope of the initiative
4. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 255, 257-59
(1955).
5. JACKSON, THE SUFFRAGE, ELECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION ARTI-
CLES OF THE 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION 9 (paper written for the Committee of 50 to
Re-examine the Illinois Constitution, published by the Illinois Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Cooperation, 1987).
6. See generally S. GOVE & T. KITsos, REVISION SUCCESS: THE SIXTH ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 13 (State Constitutional Convention Studies, No. 8,
1974) (discussing Illinois' characterization as a "patronage" state and mentioning the
existence and strength of the political machine run by Chicago's first Mayor Daley); D.
KENNEY, J. VAN DER SLIK & S. PERNACCIARO, ROLL CALL! PATTERNS OF VOTING IN
THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 9-12, 16, 26 (1975) (discussing the
strength of "Daley Orthodoxy," patronage in the judicial system, and the moral reform
mindset of the citizenry present in Illinois).
7. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. See infra note 8 for text of provision. The three previ-
ous Illinois constitutions allowed for the origination of amendment proposals only in the
legislature or through convention calls. See ILL. CONST. OF 1818, art. VII, § 1; ILL.
CONST. OF 1848, art. XII, §§ 1, 2; ILL. CONST. OF 1870, art. XIV, §§ 1, 2. All references
in this Note to the Illinois initiative provision are to Article XIV, section 3 of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970.
For informative discussions of the process of constitution writing in Illinois, see J.
CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818-1970 (1972); S. GOVE, CON-
CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1970) and S. GOVE,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ILLINOIS (paper written for the Committee of 50
to Re-examine the Illinois Constitution, published by the Illinois Commission on Inter-
governmental Cooperation, 1987).
8. Article XIV, § 3 provides in pertinent part:
Amendments to Article IV of this Constitution may be proposed by a petition
signed by a number of electors equal in number to at least eight percent of the
total votes cast. . . in the preceding gubernatorial election. Amendments shall
be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV.
ILL. CONST., art. XIV, § 3 (emphasis added) (Article IV is the legislative article).
9. 137 Ill. 2d 394, 561 N.E.2d 50 (1990).
10. Id. at 395-99, 561 N.E.2d at 51-53.
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provision. " Unfortunately, the Chicago Bar Association decision
created confusion about both the scope and the future availability
of the initiative in Illinois.
This Note analyzes the court's decision in Chicago Bar Associa-
tion. First, the history of the Illinois initiative provision is ex-
amined. Next, the Note discusses the decisions construing this
initiative provision. The Note then describes the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Chicago Bar Association. Finally, the Note ex-
amines the possible impact of this decision and concludes that,
although the court undoubtedly reached the correct result, it left
doubt as to the scope of permissible initiatives and provided scant
practical assistance to Illinois citizens hoping to use initiatives in
the future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Voter Initiatives: Competing Philosophies
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the French philosopher, was influenced
by a seventeenth century Swiss procedure similar to the modem
initiative. 12 This influence led him to espouse the merits of direct
democracy.'" Rousseau was a champion of individual sovereignty
and self-government. '4 He believed individual influence over gov-
ernment was likely to encourage true liberty, and therefore favored
the direct participation in government engendered by the initia-
tive."' An influential eighteenth century writer, Thomas Paine,
supported Rousseau's ideas concerning direct democracy. 16
Paine's writings about individual participation in government were
read widely in the Colonies. Both Rousseau and Paine's ideas af-
fected Benjamin Franklin, who convinced Pennsylvania to adopt a
state constitution providing for strong individual control of gov-
ernment in 1776.17
Franklin did not have support from all his contemporaries on
11. Id. at 406, 561 N.E.2d at 56.
12. Comment, The Current Use of the Initiative and Referendum in Ohio and Other
States, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 541, 543 (1984) (citing E. OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM
IN AMERICA 5-8 (1911)).
13. Rousseau urged that citizens be given absolute control of the state. J. ROUSSEAU,
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 26-27, 29 (Hackett 1983). See Note, supra
note 3, at 736.
14. J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 13, at 17, 42.
15. Id. at 46-47. See also Cranston, Introduction to J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CON-
TRACT at 30 (Penguin 1968).
16. See Comment, supra note 12, at 543.
17. See id.
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this position. Opponents of initiative-type government feared that
factions would be able to manipulate direct democracy at the ex-
pense of other citizens. This debate was heated during the early
days of the United States and was a topic of discussion during the
campaign to ratify the United States Constitution."8 The initia-
tive's majoritarian process is in several respects "antithetical to val-
ues held by [many of] the Founding Fathers."1 9 Initiatives can be
used by majority voting groups to repress minority voting interests
in contradiction of the republican form of government adopted by
the drafters of the United States Constitution.
James Madison strongly opposed direct democracy. He believed
that a republican form of government was the only system that
would be fair to all citizens. 20 Madison feared that "pure democ-
racy," as opposed to representative republican government, would
prove unable to prevent the majority from stifling weaker minori-
ties.2' The United States Constitution appears to follow Madison's
approach, guaranteeing a republican form of government in each
state.22
B. The History of the Illinois Limited Initiative
Historically, Illinois voters did not have an inherent or constitu-
tional right of special referendum or voter initiative unless that
right was explicitly provided for by statute. 23 Since 1970, an ex-
plicit right of initiative has been present in the Illinois Constitu-
tion. When interpreting the 1970 provision, Illinois courts defer to
the intent expressed by the constitutional convention delegates who
wrote this clause. 24 A full understanding of the delegates' intent is
18. See Earle, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST vii (Random House 1938).
19. Note, The Judiciary and Popular Democracy: Should Courts Review Ballot Meas-
ures Prior to Elections?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 919, 927 n.35 (1985).
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58-62 (J. Madison) (Wesleyan University Press
1961). Madison feared that the capable statesmen would "rarely prevail over the imme-
diate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good
of the whole." Id. at 60.
21. Id. at 48. An initiative that arguably illustrates this potential was enacted by the
voters of California in 1964. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). "Proposition
14" provided that any person renting or selling real property had complete discretion to
refuse prospective buyers and tenants at will, thus allowing racial and other discrimina-
tion in housing despite the presence of remedial civil rights ordinances. Reitman, 387
U.S. at 371-74. The United States Supreme Court, however, found that Proposition 14
violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 378-79.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
23. City of Mount Olive v. Braje, 366 Ill. 132, 135, 7 N.E.2d 851, 853 (1937).
24. See Levine, The Constitutional Initiative and the Structure and Procedures of the
General Assembly, 11 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 387, 402 (1978) (discussing Coali-
tion for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 85 Ill. 2d 453, 359 N.E.2d 138
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therefore essential to an understanding of the Illinois Supreme
Court's approach to interpreting the initiative provision.
The Committee on Suffrage and Constitutional Amendment
("the Suffrage Committee") was the smallest committee of the
1970 constitutional convention, Illinois' sixth constitutional con-
vention.25 This committee had the difficult task of revising the
vastly unpopular amendment provisions of the 1870 constitution.26
The 1870 constitution had been particularly difficult to amend,27
and several commentators noted that the sixth convention would
have been considered a success by many if it "did nothing more
than revise [the constitutional amendment procedures]. 28 The
Suffrage Committee explained that it sought to balance the needs
for flexibility and popular control against the need for constitu-
tional stability. 29 This committee and the larger convention each
rejected an unrestricted right of initiative; eventually, the Legisla-
tive Committee proposed what is now the present initiative provi-
sion.30  In the end, the sixth constitutional convention
compromised on a limited initiative that only permits proposals
regarding the structure and procedure of the legislature.31
While attempting to persuade the convention to adopt the pro-
(1976)). See also Note, Public School Fees in Illinois: A Re-examination of Constitutional
and Policy Questions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 99, 114 (noting that Illinois courts frequently
rely on constitutional debate records when construing constitutional provisions).
25. S. GOVE & T. KiTsos, supra note 6, at 58.
26. See generally A. GRATCH & V. UBIK, BALLOTS FOR CHANGE: NEW SUFFRAGE
AND AMENDING ARTICLES FOR ILLINOIS 13-15 (1973) (explaining the particular con-
cern of scholars and the public about the amendment provisions of the 1870 Constitution
that made it almost impossible for Illinois to escape from the 1870 provisions).
27. To amend the 1870 Constitution, two-thirds of the legislature and a majority of
voters had to affirmatively vote for the proposed amendment. Burnam, An Outline of
Constitutional Development, in GOVERNING ILLINOIS UNDER THE 1970 CONSTITUTION
3, 6 (D. Beam ed. 1970).
28. See A. GRATCH & V. UBIK, supra note 26, at xi; cf. S. GOVE & T. KITSOs, supra
note 6, at 1 (noting the unworkability of the amending procedures).
29. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
at 2261 (1969-70) (hereinafter PROCEEDINGS).
30. A. GRATCH & V. UBIK, supra note 26, at 49-50; see 4 PROCEEDINGS at 2712.
31. A. GRATCH & V. UBIK, supra note 26, at 48-50, 55. It has been argued that this
compromise was more political than philosophical because it placed the burden of deter-
mining the politically difficult question of what size the legislature would be on the voters,
and not on the convention delegates. By allowing the voters an opportunity, through the
initiative provision, to determine this question themselves, the delegates escaped the need
to take action of their own on this issue. Nelson, Constitutional Revision, in GOVERNING
ILLINOIS UNDER THE 1970 CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 39.
The provision that is now in effect passed in the larger convention by a roll call vote of
78 for the provision, 26 against, and 5 passes. 5 PROCEEDINGS at 4549. The initiative
provision was voted on separately from the rest of article XIV. See id. at 4547. For the
text of the initiative provision adopted, see supra note 8.
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posed initiative clause, the initiative's proponents outlined the pro-
vision's intended purpose. Delegate Perona explained that the
limited initiative would allow voters to take action in "the area of
government where it probably would be most needed because of
the vested interest of the legislature in its own makeup." 2 The
limited initiative, stated Perona, also would avoid the problems en-
countered in some other states where initiatives are used by special
interest groups to introduce "the equivalent of legislation.13 3 Per-
ona went on to explain that the initiative was intended to be lim-
ited to "the legislature itself, to its structure, makeup, and
organization. '3 4 According to the delegates, amendments would
be limited to subjects "of structure and procedure and not matters
of substantive policy. ' '
35
Delegates Tomei and Perona both stated that the courts should
have a definite role in determining the appropriateness of initiative
proposals.a6 Tomei explained that the determination of whether a
proposed initiative is "covered under this language or authorized
under this language would probably be a matter for the courts. 37
Perona stated that the courts "could iron out [interpretation] ques-
tions and protect against abuse."' 38
C. The Illinois Courts' Construction of the Limited Initiative
In 1976, the Illinois Supreme Court first discussed the initiative
provision in the consolidated cases of Coalition for Political Hon-
esty v. State Board of Elections and Gertz v. State Board of Elec-
tions.39 In Coalition I, the Coalition for Political Honesty proposed
an initiative to amend the legislative article as follows: to prohibit
legislators from being on the payroll of governmental entities other
32. 4 PROCEEDINGS at 2710.
33. Id., see Note, supra note 3, at 737 (noting California's profitable initiative indus-
try and contending that the initiative is a device used by special interest groups to further
only their own desires).
34. 4 PROCEEDINGS at 2711.
35. 6 PROCEEDINGS at 1400.
36. 4 PROCEEDINGS at 2711-12.
37. Id. at 2712.
38. Id. at 2711.
39. These consolidated cases are reported at 65 Ill. 2d 453, 359 N.E.2d 138 (1976).
In the interest of clarity and simplicity, they will be referred to as Coalition I.
The court heard another case concerning an initiative proposal in 1980. Coalition for
Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 83 Ill. 2d 236, 415 N.E.2d 368 (1980) [herein-
after Coalition II]. This case, however, did not discuss the requirements for initiative
proposal constitutionality and did not even mention Coalition I. Coalition II focused on
the constitutionality of signature verification requirements used to check initiative sup-
porters' signatures. Coalition II, 83 Il. 2d at 240-43, 415 N.E.2d at 372-74.
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than the legislature; to disqualify legislators from voting when they
had a conflict of interest; and to provide that legislative salary in-
creases would be ineffective during the term for which the legisla-
tor was elected.'
A group of taxpayers, composed in part of delegates from the
sixth constitutional convention,4' sued the State Board of Elections
to enjoin the Board from placing this proposed initiative on the
ballot.42 The plaintiff taxpayers contended that these proposals
were not within the confines of the initiative provision.43 Many of
these former convention delegates viewed the Coalition's action as
an attempt to expand the scope of the initiative provision beyond
its intended borders and thus as a "threat to the integrity" of the
constitution."
At the trial level, the circuit court determined that the initiative
provision requires proposed amendments to effect both structural
and procedural changes in the legislature. 45 Finding that the Coa-
lition's proposal affected only procedural matters of voting, the cir-
cuit court granted the plaintiffs' request for an injunction.46 The
Coalition successfully applied for a direct appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court.47
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with both the trial court and
the plaintiff taxpayers, holding that the proposed initiative amend-
ments were unconstitutional. 48  The court relied heavily on the
convention debates and on the plaintiffs' status as convention par-
40. Coalition 1, 65 Ill. 2d at 458, 359 N.E.2d at 140.
41. This group of taxpayers included six constitutional convention delegates and was
represented by the convention president. Id. at 456, 359 N.E.2d at 139; Levine, supra
note 24, at 394. Levine himself was also of counsel for these Coalition I plaintiffs. Coali-
tion 1, 65 Ill. 2d at 456, 359 N.E.2d at 139; Levine, supra note 24, at 394 n.30.
42. Coalition 1, 65 Ill. 2d at 456, 359 N.E.2d at 139. The suit was brought under ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 102, para. 11-18 (1975) to enjoin the allegedly illegal disbursement of
$1,750,000 of public funds. Id. at 456, 461, 359 N.E.2d at 139, 142. The trial court
permitted the Coalition to intervene as a defendant. Id. at 456, 359 N.E.2d at 139.
43. Id. at 458-59, 359 N.E.2d at 140-41.
44. Levine, supra note 24, at 393.
45. Coalition 1, 65 I11. 2d at 459, 359 N.E.2d at 141.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 456-57, 359 N.E.2d at 139-40.
48. Id. at 472, 359 N.E.2d at 147. The court first dealt with the issue of ripeness, and
determined that the case was justiciable before the election and possible enactment of the
proposed amendment. Id. at 461, 359 N.E.2d at 142. This element of the decision has
been recognized by most commentators as correct, and will not be discussed in this Note.
For further discussion of this issue, see Levine, supra note 24, at 397-402; Note, Coalition
for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections-Constitutional Amendments by Popular
Initiative Must Pertain to Both Structural and Procedural Subjects in the Legislative Arti-
cle, 1978 U. ILL. L. F. 122, 124-27. But cf Note, supra note 19, at 925, nn.27-28 (criti-
cizing the Illinois Supreme Court's treatment of the ripeness issue).
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ticipants49 to determine that the drafters intended to permit only
limited initiatives.5 0
First, the supreme court discussed statutory construction at
length." The court found that, in keeping with proper constitu-
tional construction and with the drafters' intent, the initiative pro-
vision phrase "[a]mendments shall be limited to structural and
procedural subjects"5 2 meant that an amendment proposed by ini-
tiative must affect both the structure and the procedure of the
legislature."
The court stated that this strict reading was necessary in part
because it believed that any change to the legislative article would
necessarily be either structural or procedural.54 Thus, according to
the court, the entire sentence regarding structural and procedural
changes would be unnecessary unless read to require both, because
any change would meet the requirement of affecting one or the
other category. 5 Therefore, the court construed the word "and"
in a strictly conjunctive, and not disjunctive sense. The Coalition
did not argue before the Illinois Supreme Court that the proposals
affected the structure of the legislature itself.5 6 The court stated
that, because the initiative-proposed amendments in question did
not affect both structural and procedural aspects of the legislature,
they were impermissible under the constitution. 7
Justice Schaefer vigorously dissented. He argued for a much
broader reading of "and," explaining that the word should be read
in an alternative, and not a strictly conjunctive manner. 9 Further,
Justice Schaefer contended that the court should adopt a standard
different from the majority's "structural and procedural" test for
49. See Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 467-72, 359 N.E.2d at 144-47; see supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
50. See Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 467, N.E.2d at 145.
51. Id. at 463-66, 359 N.E.2d at 143-44.
52. ILL. CONST., art. XIV, § 3; see supra note 8.
53. Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 463-66, 359 N.E.2d at 143-44. The size of the general
assembly is an example of a structural aspect of the legislature. An example of a proce-
dural aspect of the legislature is legislators' eligibility to vote on specific issues.
54. Id. at 466, 359 N.E.2d at 144.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 459, 472, 359 N.E.2d at 141, 147.
57. Id. at 472, 359 N.E.2d at 147.
58. See id. at 473, 359 N.E.2d at 147 (Schaefer, J., dissenting). Before serving as an
Illinois Supreme Court Justice, Walter Schaefer worked with the future president of the
1970 constitutional convention, counsel for the plaintiffs in Coalition L to form and serve
on the influential Chicago Bar Association Committee on Constitutional Revision. J.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 121 n.l. This committee has been described as a "young,
able, ambitious and idealistic elite." Id. at 121.
59. Coalition 1, 65 Ill. 2d at 473, 359 N.E.2d at 148 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 221126
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determining the constitutionality of initiative proposals.6 He ar-
gued that amendments proposed by initiative are constitutional if
they are either structural or procedural, as long as they do not
accomplish "substantive changes" in the law governing the Illinois
legislature.6'
Justice Schaefer based these conclusions on his reading of the
legislative article of the Illinois Constitution. He explained that
the legislative article contains several provisions that relate to
neither structural nor procedural matters, such as the "basic grant
of legislative power."' 62 Thus a requirement for either structural or
procedural change would limit the initiative power to non-substan-
tive topics, yet would allow for the type of change through initia-
tive envisioned by the convention delegates. 63  Applying this
standard to his belief that the Coalition's proposal regarding legis-
lators' voting ability related to procedure and was not substantive
in nature, Justice Schaefer found the section to be proper under the
constitution."
The Illinois Appellate Court also had one occasion before Chi-
cago Bar Association to construe the Illinois initiative provision. In
1982, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District decided
Lousin v. State Board of Elections.65  Like Coalition I, Lousin in-
volved a number of taxpayers suing to enjoin 66 the State Board of
Elections from spending public funds to place a Coalition for Polit-
ical Honesty initiative proposal on the ballot.67 The proposed
amendment at issue in Lousin attempted to expand the initiative by
60. Id. at 474-75, 359 N.E.2d at 148-49 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Schaefer, J., dissenting). This is essentially the position that the Attorney
General advanced on behalf of the Board. See Levine, supra note 24, at 407.
62. Coalition 1, 65 Ill. 2d at 474, 359 N.E.2d at 148 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 474-76, 359 N.E.2d at 148-49 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 476, 359 N.E.2d at 149 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
65. 108 Ill. App. 3d 496, 438 N.E.2d 1241 (1982).
66. The injunction was sought under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, para. 11-17 (1979) to
prevent the Board from spending $1,053,000 of public funds to process the allegedly un-
constitutional initiative. Lousin, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 438 N.E.2d at 1244-45.
67. Lousin, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 438 N.E.2d at 1244-45. The trial court permitted
the Coalition to intervene as a defendant. Id. at 501, 438 N.E.2d at 1245; see supra note
42. Ann Lousin, the named plaintiff, was a plaintiff in Coalition I and was a member of
the research staff of the constitutional convention. Coalition 1, 65 Ill. 2d at 456, 359
N.E.2d at 139. Elmer Gertz, named plaintiff in the case consolidated with Coalition I,
along with four other convention delegates, was also a Lousin plaintiff. Compare Lousin,
108 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 438 N.E.2d at 1244 with Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 456, 359 N.E.2d
at 139 and S. GovE & T. Kirsos, supra note 6, at 162 Appendix B. Samuel Witwer,
president of the convention, again was among the plaintiffs' attorneys. See Lousin, 108
Ill. App. 3d at 497, 438 N.E.2d at 1242; see supra note 41.
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allowing indirect initiative legislation68 through what the Coalition
called "measures. "69 As proposed, the measure process would al-
low citizens to introduce bills dealing with any subject into the leg-
islature if the bill, or measure, received a requisite number of
signatures.70 In effect, this proposal would have allowed voters to
participate directly in the creation of ordinary statutes through ini-
tiative procedures. 71 The trial court held for the plaintiffs, and an
expedited appeal ensued.72
The appellate court quoted the Coalition I discussion of the con-
vention debates73 and concluded that the delegates intended to pro-
vide "only a narrowly defined constitutional initiative. ' 74  The
court noted that Illinois initiatives must relate to the legislative ar-
ticle and must deal with structural and procedural subjects.7
The court applied the "structural and procedural" test of Coali-
tion L 76 It held that the proposed measure system involved legisla-
tive power to propose bills.77 Thus, it did not involve either
procedural or structural matters.78 Since the result sought by the
Coalition was not a structural or procedural change in the legisla-
ture, but was instead a diffusion of legislative power to propose
bills, the court found the proposal to be unconstitutional.79
The Lousin court, along with its application of the Coalition I
majority test, focused on Justice Schaefer's dissent in Coalition I
and treated his discussion of substantive changes as controlling. 80
However, the appellate court ignored Justice Schaefer's discussion
of the proper construction of "and" in the initiative provision, stat-
68. See supra note 2.
69. Lousin, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 497-501, 438 N.E.2d at 1242-44.
70. Id. at 498, 438 N.E.2d at 1243. The requisite percentage of voters needed was six
percent, two percent less than that required for direct initiatives. See id.; see also, supra
note 8.
71. D. MILLER, 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED FOR LEGISLATORS 101
(3d ed. 1987).
72. Lousin, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 438 N.E.2d at 1245.
73. Id. at 502-04, 438 N.E.2d at 1245-46.
74. Id. at 503, 438 N.E.2d at 1246.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 503-04, 438 N.E.2d at 1246.
77. Id. at 503, 438 N.E.2d at 1246 (citing Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 474-75, 359 N.E.2d
at 148-49 (Schaefer, J., dissenting)).
78. See id. at 504, 438 N.E.2d at 1246.
79. Id. See D. MILLER, supra note 71, at 101. Note that this finding fits squarely
within Justice Schaefer's rationale that a change to the legislative article could effect a
change that was neither structural nor procedural. See supra notes 62-63 and accompa-
nying text.
80. See Lousin, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 503-04, 438 N.E.2d at 1246.
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ing that he had dissented only "on other issues."'" Following Jus-
tice Schaefer's dissenting opinion in Coalition I, the Lousin court
implied that legislative power is neither structural nor proce-
dural.8 2 Quoting Justice Schaefer, the court found that the power
at issue in the measure proposed by the Coalition went beyond
structure and procedure, and was a substantive matter.8 3 Applying
Justice Schaefer's conclusion that substantive issues can not be
raised by initiatives, the appellate court held that the initiative in
question was unconstitutional.8 4
The 1982 Lousin decision was the last word from the Illinois
courts concerning the initiative provision in the constitution until
Chicago Bar Association. Since the Lousin court seemed to apply
portions of both the Coalition I majority and dissenting opinions,
Illinois lawyers and voters, such as the Chicago Bar Association
members, were uncertain about the status of the Coalition I test.
These voters sought guidance from the Illinois Supreme Court in
the 1990 Chicago Bar Association case.
III. CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION V. STATE BOARD OF
ELECTIONS
85
A. The Facts
The Chicago Bar Association ("CBA") sued the State Board of
Elections 6 to enjoin it from placing a Tax Accountability Amend-
ment Committee ("TAAC") initiative amendment proposal on the
ballot for the November 6, 1990 general election. 7 Nearly 500,000
Illinois voters signed the Tax Accountability Amendment petition
meeting the initiative provision's signature requirement.8 s The ini-
81. Id. at 503, 438 N.E.2d at 1246.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 504, 438 N.E.2d at 1246 (quoting Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 474-75, 359
N.E.2d at 148-49 (Schaefer, J., dissenting)).
84. Id.
85. 137 Ill. 2d 394, 561 N.E.2d 50 (1990).
86. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants in this case were convention delegates. Compare
Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 Ill. 2d at 394-95, 561 N.E.2d at 51 (listing parties) with S. GoVE
& T. KITsos, supra note 6, at 61-69 Appendix B (listing convention delegates). The CBA
brought this case to avoid the needless expenditure of state funds. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137
Ill. 2d at 396, 561 N.E.2d at 51. Several CBA members, however, were concerned that
their dues were being used to maintain this suit. Chicago Tribune, June 15, 1990, § 2
(DuPage), at 6, col. 1.
87. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 Ill. 2d at 396, 561 N.E.2d at 51. The injunction was
sought under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 11-301, 11-303 (1987) to prevent the Board
from disbursing public money. Id. The trial court permitted the TAAC to intervene as a
defendant. Id. at 396, 561 N.E.2d at 52.
88. Id. at 395, 561 N.E.2d at 51; see supra note 8.
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tiative proposed a requirement for a "super majority," a vote by
three-fifths of the members of the legislature, to pass any law that
would result in an increase to state revenue.8 9 Further, the initia-
tive proposed the creation of Revenue Committees that would be
required to hold public hearings on potential revenue bills, and to
endorse the bills by a Committee majority before presenting them
to the legislature. 9°
The CBA filed its original complaint in late May 1990, less than
six months before the November 6, 1990 election. 9' The trial court
heard the case on an expedited basis.92 It found that the proposed
amendment met the requirements of the initiative provision and
granted summary judgment for the TAAC.93 In the interest of
resolving the matter well before the election, the Illinois Supreme
Court granted the CBA's request for a direct appeal. 94
B. The Illinois Supreme Court Decision
Before the Illinois Supreme Court, the CBA used the Coalition I
test to support its allegation that the proposed amendment ex-
ceeded the parameters of the initiative provision because it altered
only legislative procedure and not legislative structure. 9" The CBA
argued that, because committees already were used in the legisla-
ture, the addition of Revenue Committees would not change the
legislative structure.96
89. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 Ill. 2d at 397, 561 N.E.2d at 52. In pertinent part, the
proposed Tax Accountability Amendment provided:
(a) A bill that would result in the increase of revenue to the State may become
law only by a vote of three-fifths of the members in each house of the General
Assembly.
(b) Each house of the General Assembly shall have a revenue committee. It
shall be the sole and the exclusive responsibility of the revenue committees to
consider all bills which would result in an increase or decrease of revenue to the
State....
(d) The revenue committees may not vote upon a bill until a public hearing on
the bill has been held.
Id. at 397-98, 561 N.E.2d at 52.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 396, 561 N.E.2d at 51.
92. Id. at 396-97, 561 N.E.2d at 52. The Illinois Supreme Court declined to hear the
case as an original action, finding that it had no jurisdiction. Id. at 396, 561 N.E.2d at 52.
It did, however, direct the trial court to enter a ruling by July 2, 1990. Id. The trial court
heard the arguments approximately one month after the original complaint was filed and
ruled by July 2. Id. at 396-97, 561 N.E.2d at 52.
93. Id. at 397, 561 N.E.2d at 52.
94. See id. This appeal was granted pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(b).
95. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 Ill. 2d at 400, 561 N.E.2d at 53-54.
96. Id.
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The TAAC countered these arguments by stating that the pro-
posed amendment would alter the structure of the legislature by
adding a new legislative committee and by outlining the member-
ship of that committee.97 Further, the TAAC contended that the
requirements of a public hearing and a Revenue Committee major-
ity for bill submission to the legislature would alter the procedure
used to introduce bills.98 Thus, the TAAC argued that the propo-
sal would alter both procedural and structural aspects of the legis-
lature, in accordance with the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in
Coalition 1.9
The court began its analysis with a brief discussion of Coalition I
and Lousin.lo The court explained that the Coalition I court did
not define the substantive limits on initiative proposals that were at
issue in Chicago Bar Association. 10 After noting the Lousin court's
reliance on Justice Schaefer's dissent in Coalition I, the Illinois
Supreme Court quoted the Lousin holding that the initiative pro-
cess cannot be used to create a substantive change such as realloca-
tion of legislative power. 0 2
Consistent with its usual practice when interpreting the constitu-
tion, the court continued its discussion with a detailed review of
the 1970 constitutional convention debates. 03  The Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that "only a very limited form of consti-
tutional initiative was acceptable" to the convention delegates.' ° 4
Further, the court explained what it labeled as a significant conclu-
97. Id. at 400, 561 N.E.2d at 53.
98. Id.
99. Id. Alternatively, the TAAC argued that Coalition I should be reversed. Brief
for TAAC at 34. The TAAC asserted that the Coalition I court's conjunctive reading of
the structural and procedural requirement was too restrictive. Id. In part, the TAAC
based this argument on the convention's "Address to the People" regarding the constitu-
tion drafted by the delegates. Id. at 35. This Address contained a clearly-labeled "expla-
nation" of the proposed constitution. 7 PROCEEDINGS 2667. That explanation was
written by the delegates and stated that "[a]mendments... of a structural or procedural
nature" may be proposed through the initiative process. Id. at 2677. Thus, the TAAC
reasoned, the initiative provision was intended to be read in a disjunctive manner. Brief
for TAAC at 35-36. The Chicago Bar Association court did not address this compelling
argument, and instead based its determination of drafter intent on the text of the conven-
tion debates.
100. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 Ill. 2d at 399, 561 N.E.2d at 53 (citing Coalition for
Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 11. 2d 453, 359 N.E.2d 138 (1976) and
Lousin v. State Bd. of Elections, 108 Ill. App. 3d 496, 438 N.E.2d 1241 (1982)). Justice
Ryan wrote the opinion for a unanimous court.
101. Id. at 399, 561 N.E.2d at 53.
102. Id. (citing Lousin, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 503, 438 N.E.2d at 1246).
103. Id. at 401-03, 561 N.E.2d at 54-55, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
104. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 Ill. 2d at 401, 561 N.E.2d at 64.
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sion: the convention delegates did not intend the limited initiative
provided in the constitution to be used to accomplish substantive
constitutional changes."°5 To emphasize this point, the court cited
Justice Schaefer's dissent in Coalition I, explaining that the intent
of the convention delegates was to ensure that "substantive
changes" not be made through voter initiatives. 0 6
The supreme court next explained that the reliance by both par-
ties on the "structural and procedural" test of Coalition I was mis-
placed."0 7 The court recognized that the proposed amendment,
briefs, and arguments of the TAAC were "crafted to accommodate
the holding of Coalition L ' ' 18 Stating that "we need not focus on
[the structural and procedural] issue here," the court explained
that the important constitutional language for Chicago Bar Associ-
ation was not "structural and procedural" but was instead "limited
to ... subjects contained in Article IV."' 9
Examining the TAAC proposal in this light, the court found
that many substantive topics could be introduced in initiative pro-
posals worded similarly to the Tax Accountability Amendment.1 0
The court recognized that a substantive issue, taxation, was in-
cluded in this proposed amendment."' The court noted that to
allow a proposal such as the one advanced by the TAAC to be
placed on the ballot would "violate the intent so clearly expressed
in the convention."'" 2 Therefore, the court held that the inclusion
of the substantive tax issue in the proposed amendment expanded
it beyond structural and procedural matters and made it impermis-
sible under the constitution." 3
C. The "Dissent"
Although Chicago Bar Association was a unanimous decision by
the Illinois Supreme Court, there was a vocal dissent from the Illi-
nois media and political community. Before the decision, the
TAAC had claimed that summary judgment for the CBA would
105. Id. at 403, 561 N.E.2d at 55 (citing 6 PROCEEDINGS 1401).
106. Id. at 404-05, 561 N.E.2d at 56 (citing Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 474-75, 359
N.E.2d at 148 (Schaefer, J., dissenting)). See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
107. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 Ill. 2d at 403, 561 N.E.2d at 55.
108. Id. at 400, 561 N.E.2d at 53.
109. Id. at 403, 561 N.E.2d at 55 (quoting ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3); see supra note
8.
110. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 Ill. 2d at 405-06, 561 N.E.2d at 56; see supra note 89 for
the text of the proposed amendment.
111. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 IlL. 2d at 404, 561 N.E.2d at 55.
112. Id. at 406, 561 N.E.2d at 56.
113. Id.
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sound the death knell for Illinois voter initiatives and would "be
the end of the citizen initiative in Illinois.""' 4 Two days after the
court's August 22, 1990 ruling in favor of the CBA, the TAAC
nevertheless vowed that it would continue to press for the pro-
posed amendment, though it admitted that it could not afford the
expense of an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1 5 The
group hopes to raise the issue in the May, 1991 legislative
session. " 16
The TAAC was not alone in its vocal opposition to the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision. Both the Republican and the Demo-
cratic gubernatorial candidates condemned the court's decision." 7
Jim Edgar, the successful candidate in the gubernatorial race,
called the decision "a dark day for the democratic process in Illi-
nois."' " Representatives of both parties promised to abide by the
spirit of the amendment and to "keep faith" with the principles
behind the proposal." 9 The media criticized the timing of the Au-
gust, 22, 1990 ruling that provided the TAAC with only nine days
to seek a reversal of the decision before the August 31, 1990 ballot
certification deadline. 20
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Correctly Limited the Illinois Initiative to Non-
Substantive Matters
Illinois never has permitted broad direct democracy. The dele-
gates to the sixth constitutional convention made it clear that they
intended the initiative provided for in Article XIV, section 3 to be
quite limited. 2 ' The record of the convention debates and the fact
that convention delegates sued twice to protect the integrity of the
provision demonstrate their desire for a narrow, abuse-free initia-
l 14. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 10, 1990, § 2 (Chicagoland), at 3 col. 3.
115. Bond Buyer, Aug. 24, 1990, at 2. An attorney for the TAAC explained that the
group planned to pursue political avenues in hopes of getting the amendment on the next
election ballot. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. These candidates were then-Illinois Attorney General Neil Hartigan and
then-Illinois Secretary of State Jim Edgar.
118. Remarks of Jim Edgar on the radio program Illinois 1990 (WCKG FM 105.9
radio broadcast, Dec. 12, 1990) (transcript available from the Illinois Bureau of Informa-
tion Services).
119. Bond Buyer, Aug. 24, 1990, at 2. These representatives included both guberna-
torial candidates and Jim Burns, a candidate for Lieutenant Governor. Id.
120. Bond Buyer, Aug. 23, 1990, at 2.
121. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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tive provision. 12 2 Attempts by several Illinois groups to expand the
initiative to a broader, more general provision certainly were at
odds with the intent of the drafters.
By stressing the plain intent of the constitutional convention to
provide for only the most limited initiatives, the court did an excel-
lent job of explaining why the substantive changes attempted by
the TAAC provision were unconstitutional. The court made it
clear that amendments proposed by initiative cannot create sub-
stantive changes. In this respect, the court provided solid guidance
to voter groups and lower courts concerning the substantive scope
of permissible initiative proposals. The Illinois Supreme Court ac-
ted wisely in Chicago Bar Association by refusing to extend direct
democracy in Illinois beyond its intended scope. 23
B. The Court Left Doubt as to the Continued Vitality of the
Coalition I Test
The court's well-reasoned position on substantive issues and ini-
tiative proposals has evolved in a disjointed manner. Chicago Bar
Association poorly incorporates the test established in Coalition I,
and does not explain its reliance on the Coalition I dissenting
opinion.
In Coalition I, the supreme court attempted to establish a test for
the constitutionality of initiative proposals. 2 4 Though the Lousin
court purported to apply this test, in fact it adopted the position of
the Coalition I dissent. 25 The Lousin court quoted and followed
Justice Schaefer's dissent when it stated that amendments cannot
be substantive and therefore must include only structural and pro-
cedural matters. 26  Further, the Lousin court accepted Justice
Schaefer's contention that some changes to the legislative article,
such as changes in power, extend beyond structural and procedural
matters. 27 However, Justice Schaefer's arguments were rejected
explicitly by the majority of the Coalition I court. 28
In Chicago Bar Association, the Illinois Supreme Court implic-
122. See supra notes 41, 67, and accompanying text.
123. At least one commentator agreed with the outcome of the Coalition I decision
because it similarly confined the Illinois initiative to its intended narrow scope. See Le-
vine, supra note 24, at 408.
124. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
125. See Lousin v. State Bd. of Elections, 108 111. App. 3d 496, 503-04, 438 N.E.2d
1241, 1246 (1982); see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
126. Lousin, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 503-04, 438 N.E.2d at 1246.
127. See supra notes 62, 83 and accompanying text.
128. Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 466, 359
N.E.2d 138, 144 (1976).
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itly sanctioned this adoption of the Coalition I dissent when it re-
lied on the part of the Lousin decision that followed Justice
Schaefer.' 29 The Illinois Supreme Court then explicitly established
Justice Schaefer's "no substantive changes" test without noting his
rejection of the requirement that an initiative proposal affect both
structural and procedural aspects of the legislature. 130 Thus, the
current test for initiative proposal constitutionality in Illinois ap-
pears to approximate the test proposed by Justice Schaefer in Coa-
lition I, which was applied by the Illinois Appellate Court in
Lousin. If Coalition I were before the supreme court today, the
court's analysis would be likely to focus on the substantive aspects
of the proposed initiative. Under this standard, the legislator vot-
ing section of the Coalition's proposal probably would be
constitutional.
Yet it is not clear that Coalition I would be analyzed in such a
manner today because the Chicago Bar Association court did not
discuss its previous insistence on a conjunctive reading of the pro-
vision that an amendment proposal affect both legislative structure
and procedure.' 3 ' The Chicago Bar Association court neglected
precedent by not answering the question raised by the parties con-
cerning the effect that the TAAC proposal had on the structure of
the legislature. 132 Both sides raised valid arguments concerning the
possible structural and procedural effects of the Tax Accountabil-
ity Amendment that the court should have resolved if the strict
"and" requirement of the Coalition I analysis retains validity. By
simply stating that structural and procedural issues were not of
concern in Chicago Bar Association, the court appeared to dismiss
the Coalition I test. 133
If the Coalition I test had been applied in Chicago Bar Associa-
tion, the TAAC proposal might have passed constitutional muster.
Both sides agreed that the voting requirements of the proposal
changed the procedure of the legislature. 34 The TAAC's conten-
tion that the addition of committees with mandatory membership
changed the structure of the legislature is a persuasive argument.
It is also consistent with the delegates' belief, expressed during the
convention debates, that a change in the number of legislative
129. See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, 137 Ill. 2d 394, 399, 561 N.E.2d
at 50, 53 (1990).
130. Id. at 403-05, 561 N.E.2d at 55-56; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
133. See Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 I11. 2d at 403, 561 N.E.2d at 55.
134. See id. at 400, 561 N.E.2d at 53.
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houses would change legislative structure. 35
On the other hand, it is possible that the Tax Accountability
Amendment may be unconstitutional under the Coalition I test.
The CBA presented a compelling argument that the addition of
Revenue Committees would not create any structural change in a
legislature already operating with many committees. 3 6 In addi-
tion, the CBA argument is consistent with the delegates' intent to
allow initiatives only in limited situations. This confusion illus-
trates the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court did a disservice to
future initiative proposal drafters by not explaining the status and
correct application of the Coalition I test.
Although the court stated that the Coalition I standard was not
applicable only "so far as this case is concerned,"' 37 it is not clear
from the court's opinion whether it will still insist that proposals
affect both structural and procedural matters. 38 Justice Schaefer
explicitly rejected a strict conjunctive reading of the initiative pro-
vision. 139 The Chicago Bar Association court should have explained
the status of the Coalition I test and corresponding interpretation
of the Illinois initiative provision in light of its adoption of at least
part of Justice Schaefer's dissent."4°
V. IMPACT
Illinois has now adopted, judicially as well as legislatively, a di-
rect initiative theory that parallels the theories of James Madison.
The voter initiative abuses foreseen by Madison and present in
other states' 4' will be avoided in Illinois as long as the court re-
mains as vigilant in upholding the intent of the convention dele-
gates as it was in Chicago Bar Association. Blatant attempts to
abuse the initiative will be thwarted by this decision. Madison's
fears of majoritarian rule were echoed by the Illinois 1970 constitu-
tional convention delegates, and it appears that Illinois courts will
continue to guard against the problems of "pure democracy" in a
135. 4 PROCEEDINGS at 2712.
136. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 137 Ill. 2d at 400, 561 N.E.2d at 53-54.
137. Id. at 403, 561 N.E.2d at 55.
138. The court never explicitly eliminated the test, and twice referred to the fact that
the proposed amendment should have been confined to structural and procedural mat-
ters. In so doing, however, the court did not state whether both elements are still re-
quired. Id. at 403-06, 561 N.E.2d at 55-56.
139. Coalition 1, 65 Ill. 2d at 473, 359 N.E.2d at 147-48 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
140. Justice Schaefer's complete position is that amendments can be structural or
procedural, as long as they do not effect substantive changes. Id. at 473-76, 359 N.E.2d
at 148-49 (Schaefer, J., dissenting); see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 33.
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manner that was envisioned by the drafters of the initiative
provision. 14 2
Adopting Madison's position, however, does foreclose most
voter initiative opportunities in Illinois. The TAAC's recognition
that the political arena is the environment in which a proposal like
the Tax Accountability Amendment is most likely to flourish is
certainly correct. 143 Unfortunately, it is doubtful that the legisla-
ture will voluntarily implement many of the changes proposed by
the initiative movements, as these changes are often against the leg-
islators' self-interest. 1 Therefore, unless lobbying such as that
proposed by the TAAC is effective, Illinois voters unquestionably
will pursue further initiative amendments.
The Chicago Bar Association court gave scant practical assist-
ance to these voter groups planning to draft non-substantive initia-
tive proposals under the initiative provision. After Chicago Bar
Association, it is not clear exactly what standard or test, if any, a
non-substantive amendment proposed by initiative must meet. The
Illinois Supreme Court adopted the position of the Coalition I dis-
sent for initiatives involving substantive issues. However, the sta-
tus of the Coalition I majority test for non-substantive proposals is
unclear. Thus far, the court determinations have been based
largely on the specific facts of each case, and more litigation proba-
bly will occur before the Illinois Supreme Court enunciates a com-
prehensive standard. Explicit adoption of the standard proposed
by Justice Schaefer would give Illinois guidance regarding the initi-
ative proposal, provide necessary flexibility, and protect against
abuse of initiatives in attempts to change substantive areas of the
law.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Chicago Bar Association v. State Board of Elections the Illinois
Supreme Court properly protected the voter initiative in Illinois
against possible abuse. In so doing, however, the court failed to
clarify the current vitality of previous decisions. This sets a dan-
gerous example for lower courts that are expected to apply existing
142. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
144. See 4 PROCEEDINGS at 2710. One commentator predicts that the members of
the legislature and their supporters will attempt to eliminate the initiative provision, if
given the chance, as it has been used successfully against their own self-interest. J. JACK-
SON, supra note 5, at 10. See also R. POSEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF ILLINOIS/1970:
SIMPLIFIED AND EXPLAINED 79 (4th ed. 1971) (positing that the idea behind the initia-
tive provision is a fear that the legislature will not tend to problems within itself).
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case law in an understandable fashion. In the end, Illinois is left
with a voter initiative provision that has been interpreted well and
applied correctly in certain circumstances. Illinois, however, also
is left without strong guidance on how to apply the provision in the
future.
STEPHANIE RAE WILLIAMS*
* I want to express special thanks to my wonderful mother, attorney Barbara Lester
Williams, whose perseverance in the law both inspired me and created easier access to the
legal profession for the women of my generation.
[Vol. 221138
